In order to handle inconsistent knowledge bases in a reasonable way, one needs a logic which allows nontrivial inconsistent theories. Logics of this sort are called paraconsistent. One of the oldest and best known approaches to the problem of designing useful paraconsistent logics is da Costa's approach, which seeks to allow the use of classical logic whenever it is safe to do so, but behaves completely differently when contradictions are involved. Da Costa's approach has led to the family of logics of formal (in)consistency (LFIs). In this paper we provide in a modular way simple non-deterministic semantics for 64 of the most important logics from this family. Our semantics is 3-valued for some of the systems, and infinite-valued for the others. We prove that these results cannot be improved: neither of the systems with a three-valued non-deterministic semantics has either a finite characteristic ordinary matrix or a two-valued characteristic non-deterministic matrix, and neither of the other systems we investigate has a finite characteristic non-deterministic matrix. Still, our semantics provides decision procedures for all the systems investigated, as well as easy proofs of important proof-theoretical properties of them.
Introduction
One of the most difficult problems concerning reasoning with uncertainty is that of contradictory data. The following quotation from [17] describes the problem as follows:
"It is a fact of life that large knowledge bases are inherently inconsistent, in the same way large programs are inherently buggy. Moreover, within a con-ventional logic, the inconsistency of a knowledge base has the catastrophic consequence that everything is derivable from the knowledge base."
It follows that in order to handle inconsistent knowledge bases in a reasonable way, one needs an unconventional logic: a logic which allows nontrivial inconsistent theories. Logics of this sort are called paraconsistent.
There are several approaches to the problem of designing a useful paraconsistent logic (see e.g. [9, 7, 14] ). One of the oldest and best known is da Costa's approach ( [15] ), which seeks to allow the use of classical logic whenever it is safe to do so, but behaves completely differently when contradictions are involved. Da Costa's approach has led to the family of LFIs (Logics of Formal (In)consistency -see [13] ). This family is based on two main ideas. The first is that propositions should be divided into two sorts: the "normal" (or consistent) propositions, and the "abnormal" (or inconsistent) ones. Classical logic can (and should) be applied freely to normal propositions, but not to abnormal ones. The second idea is to formally introduce this classification into the language. When this is done by employing a special (primitive or defined) unary connective • (where the intuitive meaning of •ϕ is : "ϕ is consistent") we get a special type of LFIs: the C-systems ( [12] ).
The class of C-systems is the most important and useful subclass of the class of logics of formal (in)consistency. So far, the main shortcoming of this class has been the lack of a corresponding intuitive semantics, which would be easy to use and would provide real insight into these logics. 1 In this paper we remedy this by providing simple, modular non-deterministic semantics for the 64 most basic C-systems. Our semantics is based on the use of non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices). These are multi-valued structures (introduced in [1] [2] [3] ) where the value assigned by a valuation to a complex formula can be chosen non-deterministically out of a certain nonempty set of options. Although applicable to a much larger family of logics, the semantics of finite Nmatrices has all the advantages that the semantics of ordinary finite-valued semantics provides. In particular:
(1) The semantics of finite Nmatrices is effective (see Proposition 2 below).
Hence a logic with a finite characteristic Nmatrix is necessarily decidable. (2) A logic with a finite characteristic Nmatrix is finitary (i.e.: the compactness theorem obtains for it -see [3] ). (3) There is a well-known uniform method ( [18, 8] ) for constructive cut-free calculus of n-sequents for any logic which has an n-valued characteristic matrix. This method can easily be extended to logics which have a finite characteristic Nmatrix (see [4] ).
Nmatrices seem to be particularly useful for reasoning on uncertainty because uncertainty concerning the truth-value assigned to a formula is their most crucial feature. This potential in this area is demonstrated in this paper by applying them for the special case of paraconsistent reasoning.
The semantics we provide in this paper is 3-valued for some of the systems, and infinite-valued for the others. We also prove that our results cannot be improved: neither of the simpler systems has either a finite characteristic ordinary matrix or a two-valued characteristic Nmatrix, and neither of the other systems has a finite characteristic Nmatrix. Still, our semantics leads to easy decision procedures for all the systems we investigate. Moreover: as a demonstration of the power of our semantics, we use it to show a very important proof-theoretical property: in most of the systems we consider two formulas are logically indistinguishable iff they are identical, and all of the systems have this property with respect to formulas without •.
Preliminaries

A Taxonomy of C-Systems
Definition 1 Let HCL + be some standard Hilbert-type system which has M P as the only inference rule, and is sound and strongly complete for the L + cl -fragment of CP L (classical propositional logic). The logic B 2 is the logic in L C which is obtained from HCL + by adding the schemata:
Definition 2 Let Ax be the set consisting of the following axioms:
is the system obtained by adding the axioms in X to B.
2 The logic B is called mbC in [13] .
Notation: We'll usually denote B[X] by Bs, where s is a string consisting of the names of the axioms in X (thus we'll write Biel rather than
Note. It is easy to see that the converse of (i) (i.e. ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬•ϕ) and the converse of (l) (i.e.
•ϕ ⊃ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)) are theorems of B. Together the four implications intuitively mean that •ϕ and ¬(ϕ∧¬ϕ) "have the same meaning". On the other hand (d) and its converse (together with (i)) intuitively mean that •ϕ and ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ϕ) "have the same meaning". At this point it should be emphasized that (d) and (l) are not equivalent in the present context (in fact, this well-known fact easily follows from the results of this paper).
Non-deterministic Matrices
Our main semantic tool in what follows will be the following generalization of the concept of a matrix given in [1] [2] [3] 
if it satisfies every formula in Γ. (4) M , the consequence relation induced by the Nmatrix M, is defined by:
In the literature on LFIs one usually writes Cs instead of our Bcs When X includes the axiom (c). Thus what we denote by Bcial is called Cila in [12, 13] . 4 A special two-valued case of this definition was essentially introduced in [6] . Another particular case of the same idea, using a similar name, was used in [11] . It should also be noted that Carnielli's "possible-translations semantics" (see [10] ) was originally called "non-deterministic semantics".
for L if L is both sound and complete for it (i.e.:
Note: We shall identify an ordinary (deterministic) matrix with an Nmatrix whose functions in O always return singletons.
for every n-ary connective of L and every x ∈ V n 2 .
The following proposition can easily be proved:
Perhaps the most important property of the semantics of Nmatrices is its being effective in the sense that for determining whether T M ϕ (where M is an Nmatrix) it always suffices to check only partial valuations, defined only on subformulas of T ∪ {ϕ}. This is due to the following obvious proposition:
be an Nmatrix for L, and let W be the set of formulas of L. Assume that W is a subset of W which is closed under subformulas, and that v : W → V is a partial valuation that respects
Corollary 1 If M is a finite Nmatrix then M is decidable.
The Systems with finite-valued Nmatrices
The basic system B Definition 5
• A basic B-Nmatrix is an Nmatrix for the language L C such that:
(1) V = T I F, where T , I, and F are disjoint nonempty sets.
• A B-Nmatrix is an Nmatrix for L C which is a refinement of some basic B-Nmatrix.
• M B is the 3-valued basic B-Nmatrix in which T = {t}, F = {f }, and I = {I}.
It is easy to see that the non-deterministic truth tables corresponding to the operations in M B are:
Proof: It is straightforward to check that B is sound for any basic B-Nmatrix.
Hence the theorem follows from Proposition 1. 2
Theorem 2 M B is a characteristic Nmatrix for B.
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Proof: Soundness follows from Theorem 1. For completeness, assume that T is a theory and ϕ 0 a sentence such that T B ϕ 0 . We construct a model of T in M B which is not a model of ϕ 0 . For this extend T to a maximal theory T * such that T * B ϕ 0 . T * has the following properties:
The proofs of Properties 1-5 are exactly as in the case of HCL + : Property 1 follows from the deduction theorem (which is obviously valid for B) and the maximality of T * . Property 2 is proved first for ϕ 0 using 1 and the tautology ((ϕ 0 ⊃ ϕ) ⊃ ϕ 0 ) ⊃ ϕ 0 . It then follows for all ψ ∈ T * by 1. Properties 3-5 are easy corollaries of 1, 2, and the maximality of T * . Finally, Property 6 is immediate from Property 3 and Axiom (t), and Property 7 follows from Axiom (p).
Define now a valuation v in M B as follows:
Note that by property 6, v is well defined, and v(ψ) ∈ D = {I, t} iff ψ ∈ T * . We use this to prove that v is a legal valuation, i.e.: it respects the interpretations of the connectives in M B . That this is the case for the positive connectives easily follows from Properties 3-5 of T * . We prove next the cases of ¬ and •:
• Assume v(ψ) = f . Then ψ ∈ T * . Hence ¬ψ ∈ T * by Property 6 of T * . Thus v(¬ψ) ∈ {I, t}.
• Assume v(ψ) = t. By definition, this implies ¬ψ ∈ T * , whence v(¬ψ) = f .
• Assume v(ψ) = I. By definition, this implies ψ ∈ T * and ¬ψ ∈ T * . The latter implies v(¬ψ) ∈ {I, t}. Together with the former it also implies that
Hence v is a model of T which is not a model of v(ϕ 0 ). 
Definition 7 Let S = {i, c, e, ci, ie, ce, cie, ia, cia, iae, ciae, io, cio, ioe, cioe}
• For s ∈ S, a Bs-Nmatrix is a B-Nmatrix which satisfies Cond(x) for every x which occurs in s.
• M Bs is the unique Bs-Nmatrix in which T = {t}, F = {f }, and I = {I}.
Thus if i occurs in s then in M Bs the truth table corresponding to • is: • Bs is sound for any Bs-Nmatrix.
• M Bs is a characteristic Nmatrix for Bs.
Proof: To show the first part it suffices by Theorem 1 to check that for every x ∈ {c, i, e}, the validity of schema (x) (in a given B-Nmatrix) follows from Cond(x), and that or every x ∈ {a, o}, the validity of schema (x) follows from Cond(x) together with Cond(i). This is easy.
The proof of the second part is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2, using Bs instead of B. We only have to show that the extra conditions imposed by the extra axioms of Bs on the valuation v defined in that proof are respected:
• Suppose that (i) is an axiom of Bs, and assume v(ϕ) ∈ {t, f }. Then either ϕ ∈ T * , or ¬ϕ ∈ T * . Hence (by schema (i)) ¬•ϕ ∈ T * By definition of v, v(•ϕ) = t, as required.
• Suppose that both (i) and (a) are axioms of Bs, and that v(ϕ) ∈ {t, f }, v(ψ) ∈ {t, f }. Then by schemata (i) and (t), •(ϕ) and •(ψ) are in T * , and so •(ϕ ψ) ∈ T * by Schema (a). Hence (by Schema (p)) either ϕ ψ ∈ T * , or ¬(ϕ ψ) ∈ T * . By definition of v, this yields v(ϕ ψ) ∈ {t, f }, as required. • Suppose that both (i) and (o) are axioms of Bs, and that either v(ϕ) or v(ψ) is in {t, f }. Then by schemata (i) and (t), either
. This again implies that v(ϕ ψ) ∈ {t, f }.
• Suppose that (c) is an axiom of Bs, and v(ϕ) = f . Then ϕ ∈ T * . Hence ¬¬ϕ ∈ T * by (c). By definition of v, this implies that v(¬ϕ) = t, as required.
• Suppose that (e) is an axiom of Bs, and v(ϕ) = I. Then ϕ ∈ T * and ¬ϕ ∈ T * . Hence ¬ϕ ∈ T * , and by (e) also ¬¬ϕ ∈ T * . By definition of v, this implies that v(¬ϕ) = I, as required.
2
Corollary 2 All the 16 systems investigated in this section are decidable, and they are all different from each other.
Note. Since (o) obviously entails (a) (using positive classical logic), no element of S includes both a and o. We also do not consider here logics that include the schema (a), or the schema (o), but do not include schema (i).
In [5] it is shown that a completely modular semantics, in which (a) and (o) are treated independently of (i), can be given if we use Nmatrices with 5 truth-values rather than just 3. It is worth noting also that in that paper the schema (i) was naturally split into two independent axioms, (a) and (o) were split into three axioms, and completely modular semantics was given to each of the resulting axioms. This can easily be done also within the present 3-valued framework.
Examples:
To show the first part, let v be a legal valuation in
For the second part, it suffices by Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 to provide the following refutation in M Bcie :
For the third part, note that if v is a valuation in M Bci then v(•ψ) ∈ {t, f } for all ψ, and if v(ψ) ∈ {t, f } then also v(¬ψ) ∈ {t, f }. It follows that for all n and ϕ, v(¬ n •ϕ) ∈ {t, f }, and so v(•¬ n •ϕ) = t.
Now we show that the semantics given in this section to the various systems cannot be simplified.
Then no logic in L which lies between positive classical logic and Bcioe can have a finite characteristic matrix.
Proof: It is easy to see that if N is a unary connective definable in L and M is an n-valued deterministic matrix then for every valuation v in M and for every ψ, v(N n ψ) ∈ {v(ψ), v(N ψ), . . . , v(N n−1 ψ)}. Since for every k < n, p ∧ N p ∧ N N p ∧ ...N n−1 p ⊃ N k p is valid in positive classical logic, it follows that if M is an n-valued deterministic matrix for which positive classical logic is sound, then ψ n = p ∧ N p ∧ N N p ∧ ...N n−1 p ⊃ N n p should be valid in M (where p is atomic). Hence this formula is a theorem in every extension of positive classical logic which has an n-valued characteristic matrix. However, if we take N ϕ to be ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕ) we can refute ψ n in M Bcioe by letting v(p) = v(N p) = . . . = v(N n−1 p) = I, v(N n−1 p ∧ N n−1 p) = t, and v(N n p) = f . Hence ψ n is not provable in Bcioe (or in any weaker system).
Theorem 5
No logic L between B and Bcioe can have a weakly characteristic two-valued Nmatrix.
Proof: Let M be a two-valued Nmatrix which is weakly sound for L. It is easy to see that the interpretations of the positive connectives in M should be identical to the classical ones. The validity of the law of excluded middle forces therefore the condition ¬f = {t}. Hence there are two cases to consider:
Since this formula is not a theorem of Bcioe (it can easily be refuted in M Bcioe ), M is not weakly characteristic for L. • If t ∈ ¬t then it cannot be the case that also t ∈ •t, since otherwise (p)
would not be valid in M. It follows that •t = {f }, and so p ∧ •p ⊃ q is valid in M. Since this formula is not valid in M Bcioe , M is not weakly characteristic for L in this case too. 2
We end this section with a proof of a very important property of the systems investigated here. 
By Proposition 2 it follows that ¬¬¬(B ⊃ B) L ¬¬¬(A ⊃ A).
Hence A and B are not logically indistinguishable in L.
The proof of the third part is similar to that of the first. However, this time we use M Bcioe instead of M Bciae , and we start with a partial valuation v such that v(ψ) = I for every subformula of either
Note. Extensions of Bcio do not have the property described in the first two parts of the last theorem (and so its third part cannot be improved). Thus by using M Bcio it is easy to show that •(A ⊃ A) and •(B ⊃ B) are logically indistinguishable in Bcio for any two formulas A and B.
The Systems with Infinite-valued Nmatrices
We turn now to to the extensions of the systems handled in the previous section by the schemas (l),(d) and their combination (b). (
M Bd : This is defined like M Bl , except that ∧ is defined as follows:
M Bb : This is defined like M Bl , except that ∧ is defined as follows: To prove completeness, assume that T Bl ϕ 0 . Extend T to a maximal theory T * such that T * Bl ϕ 0 . Then T * has the Properties 1-8 from the proof of Theorem 2. Let λi.α i be an enumeration of all the formulas of L C that do not begin with ¬. Then for any formula ψ of L C there are unique n(ψ), k(ψ) such that ψ = ¬ k(ψ) α n(ψ) , where ¬ k θ is θ preceded by k negation symbols. Define a valuation v in M Bl as follows:
Now we show that v is M Bl -legal. The proofs that it is well defined and respects the operations corresponding to ∨ and ⊃ are like in the proof of Theorem 2. We consider next the cases of •, ¬ and ∧.
•: That v(•ψ) = f in case v(ψ) ∈ I is shown as in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume next that v(ψ) ∈ T ∪F. Then either ψ ∈ T * , or ¬ψ ∈ T * . It follows that ψ ∧ ¬ψ ∈ T * , and so ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ψ) ∈ T * (by Property 6). Hence • a ∈ T and b ∈ T ⇒ a ∧b = T • a ∈ T , b ∈ I or b ∈ T , a ∈ I ⇒ a ∨b = T • a ∈ F, b ∈ I or b ∈ T , a ∈ I ⇒ a ⊃b = T (5) If o occurs in s then: Proof: Let L be one of these logics. It can easily be checked that any axiom from Ax (Definition 2) which does not directly follows by classical positive logic from an official axiom of L, is not valid in M L . 2
Corollary 4 Every logic L ∈ LDB is decidable.
Proof: Theorem 8 and its proof easily imply that to check whether a given formula ϕ is provable in L, it suffices to check all legal partial valuations v in M L which assign to subformulas of ϕ values in {f }∪{t
where n * (ϕ) is the number of subformulas of ϕ which do not begin with ¬, and k * (ϕ) is the maximal number of consecutive negation symbols occurring within ϕ. This is a finite process.
The proof of Corollary 4 indicates that simpler infinite Nmatrices would be sufficient for characterizing the sets of provable formulas considered there.
be the simplest refinement of M L in which the set of truth values is {f } ∪ {t
Theorem 9 For L ∈ LDB:
is not characteristic for L.
Proof: 
We next extend Theorem 6 to the family LDC:
Theorem 10 Let L be a logic in a language which includes {¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃}. 
Proof:
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6. 2
Corollary 5 da Costa's system C 1 ( [15] ) is decidable, and two formulas are logically indistinguishable in it iff they are identical.
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Proof: In [12, 13] it is shown that C 1 and Bcial (which is called there Cila) are equivalent in the sense that Bcial is a conservative extension of C 1 , and it is also interpretable in C 1 . Hence the corollary follows from Corollary 4 and Theorem 10 (both applied to Bcial). 2
We end the paper by showing that the infinite-valued semantics given in this section cannot be replaced by a finite-valued one.
Theorem 11
No logic between Bl or Bd and Bcioeb can have a finite characteristic Nmatrix.
Proof: Assume e.g. that L is a logic between Bl and Bcioeb, and assume for contradiction that M = V M , D M , O M is an n-valued characteristic Nmatrix for L (n finite). Define T to be the union of the following three sets: Corollary 6 da Costa C 1 has no finite characteristic Nmatrix.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 11, and the fact that Bcial is interpretable in C 1 . 2
Note. The lack of finite characteristic ordinary matrices for some C-systems has been known before (see [13] ). However, what is proved in Theorem 11 is a much stronger result!
